Essays on banking IPOs

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on May 21, 2012).The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.Dissertation advisor: Dr. John HoweVita."July 2011"This dissertation explores the market reaction to analyst coverage initiations and the factors leading to coverage initiations by analysts for newly public banking stocks. I use two cases to investigate the timeliness and reaction to analyst coverage initiations. The first case serves as a means to examine how the difference in the information environment affects analyst coverage using the expiration of the quiet period to judge analyst behavior for banks. The second case allows me to look longitudinally at analyst coverage initiations and examine the factors that influence the time until coverage is initiated and if the market reacts differently to coverage with more elapsed time between the expiration of the quiet period and the first initiation of analyst coverage. For the first case, I find that analyst coverage is initiated for 15 percent of banks at the end of the quiet period and those banks experience five-day aggregate returns of -43 basis points versus 11 basis points for banks without analyst coverage initiations. Contrary to prior research, I find that underpricing is not indicative of analyst coverage. As the number of operational activities for banks increase with legislative changes, analyst coverage increases. For the second case, I find that banks with either high insider ownership after the IPO, lower leverage after the IPO, or larger size tend to have earlier coverage initiations. Banks with stock prices deviating from fundamental value do not have a strong tendency to have rapid analyst coverage following the expiration of the quiet period. However, the evidence suggests that extreme deviation from fundamental value increases the time until analyst coverage is initiated. I find that, while the cumulative aggregate returns for banks when analysts initiate coverage is negative, there is no indication that the market is more informed by the initiation of coverage.Includes bibliographical reference

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The Case of the Unidentified Energy Companies

This case provides detailed financial information for 14 firms in the energy sector across different fields. The student is put in the position of a potential job candidate tasked with identifying the field in which a firm’s major operations lie. The student’s objective is to use existing knowledge of the energy sector or financial statements to differentiate between the firms by examining the financial statements and common financial ratios for each of the firms

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Technical ReportThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Lasers for Satellite Uplinks and Downlinks

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sci2030071The use of Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (i.e., LASERs or lasers) by the U.S. Department of Defense is not new and includes laser weapons guidance, laser-aided measurements, even lasers as weapons (e.g., Airborne Laser). Lasers in support of telecommunications is also not new. The use of laser light in fiber optics shattered thoughts on communications bandwidth and throughput. Even the use of lasers in space is no longer new. Lasers are being used for satellite-to-satellite crosslinking. Laser communication can transmit orders-of-magnitude more data using orders-of-magnitude less power and can do so with minimal risk of exposure to the sending and receiving terminals. What is new is using lasers as the uplink and downlink between the terrestrial segment and the space segment of satellite systems. More so, the use of lasers to transmit and receive data between moving terrestrial segments (e.g., ships at sea, airplanes in flight) and geosynchronous satellites is burgeoning. This manuscript examines the technological maturation of employing lasers as the signal carrier for satellite communications linking terrestrial and space systems. The purpose of the manuscript is to develop key performance parameters (KPPs) to inform U.S. Department of Defense initial capabilities documents (ICDs) for near-future satellite acquisition and development. By appreciating the history and technological challenges of employing lasers rather than traditional radio frequency sources for satellite uplink and downlink signal carrier, this manuscript recommends ways for the U.S. Department of Defense to employ lasers to transmit and receive high bandwidth, large-throughput data from moving platforms that need to retain low probabilities of detection, intercept, and exploitation (e.g., carrier battle group transiting to a hostile area of operations, unmanned aerial vehicle collecting over adversary areas). The manuscript also intends to identify commercial sector early-adopter fields and those fields likely to adapt to laser employment for transmission and receipt.U.S. Air Forc

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Executive SummaryThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Project PosterThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Project PosterThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control Agreements between three Peer Adversaries

NPS NRP Technical ReportThis research will investigate the implications of China as a peer nuclear armed adversary and how this effects US deterrence strategy that has traditionally been concerned with bilateral deterrence between the USA and Russia. The introduction of a third peer nuclear armed nation adds significant complexity and dynamics that were not present before. China has not been party to previous nuclear arms control agreements and they have been developing their nuclear capabilities at a faster pace than any other nation. However, they have committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and a policy of no first use. It is vital to understand what motivates Chinese leadership, and what would cause them to voluntarily engage in arms control agreements with the purpose of adding stability to nuclear deterrence between the three nations. This research will help understand these issues, as well as offer recommendations to modify US nuclear deterrence to better deter and stabilize deterrence between the US and China while maintaining effective deterrence between the US and Russia. Also, the power dynamics between China and Russia must also be understood to help implement policies to support, and avoid mistakes that could undermine, deterrence between them.N3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.